The situation is a frustrating reality for Putin, whose forces entered Ukraine on February 24 on a mission to “demilitarize” and “demilitarize” the country, but retreated from Kyiv just over five weeks later to focus on extending control over eastern Ukraine through artillery. war. As Ukrainian forces roll back these eastern gains, Putin faces obstacles to replenishing his army’s battered ranks and degraded equipment to any extent that would allow Russia to regain the initiative on the battlefield. The result is an opportunity for Ukrainian forces, who despite their own significant losses, hope to make more territorial gains before winter conditions harden the battle lines. Further Ukrainian gains – particularly around the southern city of Kherson – would deal additional blows to Russian morale and increase pressure on Putin, who is already facing calls from Russian hardliners to announce a general mobilization that could be politically toxic for his status. The rapid collapse of the Russian front around Kharkiv in recent days “reflects structural problems with manpower and low morale in an overstretched Russian military,” said Michael Kofman, a Russian military analyst at the Virginia-based research group CNA. “The approach of the Russian military is essentially unsustainable,” Kofman said. “Russian forces are facing exhaustion, containment problems and a steady decline in combat effectiveness.” A “partial mobilization” in Russia could provide momentum for next year, Kofman said, but Russia lacks the near-term forces to defend its territory in southern Ukraine while making significant advances in the eastern Donbass region. Residents of Balakliya, in Ukraine’s Kharkiv region, received humanitarian aid on September 13 and spoke of months of horror while under Russian occupation. (Video: Reuters) Battle for Kyiv: Ukrainian bravery, Russian blunders combine to save capital Retired Lt. Gen. Ben Hodges, a former commander of the U.S. military in Europe, said the Russian military had reached what military theorist Carl von Clausewitz called “the tipping point,” or the moment when an attacking force can no longer advance. Hodges said Ukrainian forces helped achieve that. “What’s happening now is the culmination of several months of really hard work, planning and preparation by the Ukrainian general staff, to disrupt Russian logistics, destroy command posts, destroy their artillery and ammunition supplies – to weaken them that way. vulnerable to a counterattack,” Hodges said. The key now, he said, is: “Can Ukrainians handle this?” Ukraine’s Western partners will continue to send weapons and intelligence to Kyiv to allow Ukrainian forces to keep up the pressure, Hodges said, but it will still be a challenge to maintain the operation with fuel, ammunition and rested personnel without losing momentum. Having so many external partners will help Kyiv, he said. “The Russians not only have manpower problems and will-to-fight problems, but they don’t really have any friends,” Hodges said. “Iranian drones are not going to move the needle at all. I’m very skeptical of reports of North Korean munitions coming in and making a difference.” The Ukrainian military’s focus will likely shift to Kherson, the occupied city in southern Ukraine, where Russian forces are defending a vulnerable stretch of terrain on the east side of the Dnieper River. Russia has moved elite units into the region to defend the position, which will make the fight harder for the Ukrainians, analysts said. “The next thing Russia will want to do is make sure things don’t fall apart in Kherson,” said Dara Massicot, a Russian military analyst at the Rand Corp. “I think it would be very difficult for them to recover from two collapses in quick succession.” Massicot said the growing pressure on Moscow, with separatist proxies beginning to rebel and Russian military units retreating in some cases before engaging in combat, was down to the “very abusive way in which Russia manages its combat power.” . US officials see Russian setbacks in northeastern Ukraine as just “a matter of time” given the Kremlin’s months-long failure to organize, command, equip and sustain its forces on the battlefield — and its growing arsenal of weapons of Ukraine from the West. The Russian military was “riddled with all kinds of weaknesses that weren’t apparent to the leadership and probably should have been” at the start of their February 24 invasion, according to a senior US defense official who, like some others, spoke to the condition of anonymity due to the sensitivity of the subject. “Many of the key elements of a strong defense are the capabilities of your soldiers, your logistics and command capabilities, and we’ve seen fractures in all of those elements, and they’ve played out at many points over time in the east,” said senior US defense official. The rapid retreat around Kharkiv also cost Russia critical equipment that will be difficult to replace. According to preliminary estimates by Jakub Janovsky, a military analyst and contributor to the Oryx blog count of equipment losses, Russia lost 40 tanks, 50 infantry vehicles, 35 armored vehicles and two jets. US officials have estimated that Russia has suffered as many as 80,000 casualties since February, including more than 15,000 deaths. Russia’s open-source military analysis group Conflict Intelligence Team, now in Tbilisi, Georgia, estimated that the losses of equipment and personnel were so dire that it downgraded the combat capability of the Russian military in Ukraine from “offensive capability” to “capable of limited defense.” In particular, the Ukrainian successes around Kharkiv exposed the weakness of Russia’s 11th Army Corps, based in Kaliningrad, and the famous 1st Guards Tank Division, based outside Moscow. “Previously, we were not sure that the problems that were known to us, that we drew from interceptions, saying that there was a lack of working equipment or the negligence of the commanders [in individual units], were so systemic,” CIT expert Ruslan Leviev said in a Monday briefing. “But now it turned out that the 11th Army Corps was completely unable to defend the front line.” The CIT said the 11th Army Corps was the main force responding to the Ukrainian counteroffensive, but is unlikely to operate independently soon as it has been depleted following the Ukrainian advance. The Ukrainian offensive “also revealed that the organizational structure of the 1st Tank Army was completely broken due to a large number of casualties and prolonged participation in hostilities,” Leviev said, adding that the loss of these two formations is “a serious loss for the Russian army.” .” Russia’s 1st Guards Tank Army is considered an elite force, “dedicated to the defense of Moscow and intended to lead counter-attacks in the event of war with NATO,” the UK Ministry of Defense said in its daily briefing on Tuesday. However, CIT reported that the tank army has suffered huge losses since February, forcing the Russian Defense Ministry to swap military personnel between various units. “Thus, instead of independent units in a divisional structure, there were only fragments left, and from these fragments, they formed other tactical battalion groups, and everything turned into something like a mince salad,” Leviev said. “Russia no longer has the ability to regain the positions it lost to Ukraine,” Leviev added, but CIT noted that Russia may prove capable of defending its existing positions around Kherson. Ukrainian forces recaptured most of the Kharkiv region. Despite the setbacks, the Kremlin insists the war will resume on September 12. (Video: Reuters) Failures on the battlefield have caused problems for Putin among hardliners at home. Unhappy with Russia’s handling of Ukraine, pro-war Telegram bloggers boasting huge followings, state media executives and even some officials have issued rare criticism of Putin’s decision not to launch a general mobilization and try to present war as a limited function. Putin, deaf and isolated, pursues war “goals” and refuses to lose Sergey Mironov, the leader of the A Just Russia party, publicly criticized the lavish Moscow Day celebrations Putin took part in over the weekend, blessing a new Ferris wheel that reportedly broke down hours after the ceremony. “It’s time for full mobilization! But not military, but mobilization in our minds,” Mironov said, addressing the Russian parliament on Tuesday. “There can’t be a war and the whole country dancing and having fun. Enough! Only the truth and an honest assessment of what is happening will help us win.” Longtime Russian Communist Party leader Gennady Zyuganov said Russia’s venture into Ukraine can no longer be called a “special military operation,” the Kremlin’s preferred euphemism for war. “Over the past two months, the special operation in Ukraine and Donbas has turned into a war. Any war requires a response. First of all, maximum mobilization of forces and resources is required,” Zyuganov said. A few hours later, the party’s press secretary backtracked, saying that Zyuganov was referring to the “mobilization of the economy and the political system,” not the conscription of the entire eligible population, suggesting “those . . .
