The conflict has caused economic damage to all former Soviet states, most of which are dependent to one degree or another on Moscow. It has also affected their own security concerns in various ways: some emboldened by Russian setbacks, some fearing for their own independence, and some realizing they may not be able to rely on a beleaguered Moscow for help when they need it. Azerbaijan last week, for example, launched a deadly attack on Armenian towns outside Nagorno-Karabakh, testing Moscow’s appetite for intervention while back in Ukraine. Since brokering a ceasefire between the two sides in 2020, Russia has maintained a 2,000-strong peacekeeping force in the Nagorno-Karabakh region, which it is now reportedly drawing down to stoke fighting in Ukraine. Both Armenia and Azerbaijan are increasingly looking to the West, including through mediation, a bitter pill for Moscow to swallow with its own regional influence diminished. Last month, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan issued unprecedented criticism of his Russian ally, questioning the effectiveness of peacekeeping forces, and last week called for help he knows Moscow is unable to provide. Armenia’s concern is twofold – firstly that Azerbaijan will continue to exploit Russian weakness and secondly that Moscow will pressure it to join the Russian-Belarus Union state after exiting the Ukraine war. Neighboring Georgia, 20 percent of whose territory has been seized by Russia since the 2008 invasion, shares Armenia’s fear of Russian subjugation, which partly explains accusations of “benevolent neutrality” toward Moscow, including collapse of sanctions. One of the westernmost of the former Soviet states, it is not hard to imagine Tbilisi’s attitude changing if Ukraine continues to expose the Kremlin’s weakness. Even Kazakhstan, a close and long-term ally of Russia, has remained neutral in the war, refusing to help Moscow avoid sanctions and rejecting Russian demands to recognize the independence of Donetsk and Luhansk. He has even offered to increase the EU’s energy supply and find a natural gas route that bypasses Russia. Last month, Kazakhstan, along with fellow Central Asian states Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, discussed diversifying trade routes to bypass Russia and explored the prospect of a regional security alliance among the five countries to cover the expected Russian power vacuum; As former Soviet states in Europe and the Caucasus look west, Central Asian states look east to China, both for economic support and, increasingly, for security. This instability risks not only Putin failing to achieve his grand plan to draw former Soviet states deeper into Russia’s sphere of influence, but also reducing his control over some that have been there for years. His goals are shared by the political elites in Moscow, and as they see the gap widening between their goals and his ability to achieve them, they will surely wonder if it is time to switch horses. Putin cannot afford this humiliation to continue.
